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REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICA IN GOOD
GOVERNANCE DISCOURSE: POLICING AND
CONTAINING DISSIDENCE TO NEO-LIBERALISM
James Thuo Gathii*
I. INTRODUCTION
Good governance proposals are a product of a heterogeneous
coalition of forces that include international financial institutions,
western countries, and a variety of private actors. Although this
diverse range of entities proceeds from specific, and at times
contradictory, interests and orientations, in good governance they find
a common way of framing the relationship between economic
development and political freedom. The convergence on the concept
of good governance arose, during the post-debt crisis and post-Cold
War eras, amidst the backdrop of a general climate in favor of free
markets and liberal democracy.
I identify good governance as the imposition by Western,
industrialized nations and international agencies, of market governance
- through the concepts of liberal democracy and a small state - on
developing countries, especially those of sub-Saharan Africa. An
underlying aim of this push for market governance is that of increasing
the role of the private sector as the engine for economic growth and
releasing market forces from what are considered to be the constraints
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or clutches of government-imposed regulatory controls. Releasing
market forces within this framework is premised on the assumption
that the role of public law should be that of protecting and enforcing
the 'private rights' of property and freedom of contract from the re-
distributive interventionism of government control. Liberal
democracy, on its part, presupposes periodic elections within a multi-
party political system and is promoted as a necessary counterpart of
the market governance program.
In this article, I use the terms good governance, neo-liberalism, and
structural adjustment, interchangeably. The reform proposals of the
good governance agenda are a re-conceptualization of the orthodox,
structural adjustment or neo-liberal, macro-economic, reform
programs designed by the Bretton Woods institutions and an array of
public and private actors.' When these programs were initially
implemented in sub-Saharan Africa, their critics noted that even
though they were 'technically sound', attempts at macro-economic
reform or stabilization would be unsuccessful unless attention was
paid to the institutional, political, and administrative mechanisms
necessary to support their successful implementation. In sum, good
governance proposals are in part a reflection of the widening scope of
structural adjustment (market) reforms that require modifications to,
and re-alignment of, the institutional and administrative apparatuses of
the sub-Saharan African state.2
According to Nicholas Stem and Francisco Ferreira, no single definition of structural adjustment
programs is available. Hence they have been defined as a "combination of supply- and demand-side
policies.., directed toward the transformation of the structure of an economy in response to serious
disequilibria, aiming both to restore macro-economic equilibrium and to improve microeconomic
efficiency". Nicholas Stem & Francisco Ferreira, The World Bank as an Intellectual Actor, in THE
WORLD BANK: ITS FIRST HALF CENTURY 523, 540 (Davesh Kapur et al. eds., 1997). Paul Mosley, Jane
Harrigan and John Toye note that even in its most doctrinaire days, the World Bank was not a 'neo-
liberal' monolith: "For every research report vindicating the neo-liberal position, one could find another
bank publication which looked more soberly at the social and technological constraints on development,
and contemplated - without any sense of guilt or incongruity - some appropriate piecemeal social
engineering", PAUL MOSLEY ET AL., AID AND POWER: THE WORLD BANK AND POLICY-BASED LENDING
24 (1991). Mosley, Harrigan and Toye also note that any attempt to summarize the policy preferences of
the neo-liberal agenda "into one coherent and consistent package is bound to be misleading, and invite
cries of 'straw man"'. Id. at 1I. Roberto Unger, identifies two forms of neo-liberalism in the rich
industrial democracies, "one overtly intolerant of governmental activism in the economy and hostile to
worker and welfare rights; the other a chastened, liberalized version of social democracy that is fast
becoming the new center of gravity of Western politics". ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT
SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME?, 9-10 (1996).
2 For statements of these proposals from one of the Bretton Woods institutions, see WORLD BANK,
MANAGING DEVELOPMENT: THE GOVERNANCE DIMENSION - A DISCUSSION PAPER (June 26, 1991);
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Notwithstanding the well-intentioned basis for imposing these
good governance proposals on sub-Saharan African economies, the
proposals contain several significant shortcomings: First, these
programs under-emphasize and hence undermine the social and
economic rights of the African people; and second, they are based on
an ethnocentric, individualistic bias which presupposes that the
individual, rather than the community, is the center of African society.
In sub-Saharan Africa, this assumption is for the most part inaccurate.
Other critics of these market reform proposals view them as merely a
continuation of the protracted and injurious legacy of colonial, neo-
colonial, and imperial interference in African governments and their
economies. Despite the oft-stated reservations and limitations of these
programs, they have significant appeal which derives its legitimacy
and power from the assumptions that the free market system and
liberal democracy are universalizable principles. Nevertheless, while
the literature in this area has been quick to recognize the
ethnocentricity, cultural particularity and coercive imposition of these
twin projects of global governance, it has to this date failed to
acknowledge or even consider that they are based, at least in part, on
underlying assumptions and unstated, disparaging and therefore
implicitly racist stereotypes of the African state, its leadership, and its
people. The good governance agenda presents its technical and
economic jargon as an ideologically neutral and universal antidote to
the 'turmoil', 'chaos', corruption, authoritarianism and 'disorder' of
the post-colonial African experience.3  The invocation of such imagery
WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992); WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD
BANK'S EXPERIENCE (1994).
3 An underlying idea here is that identity politics is perceived as a threat not only to international
security but to international economic order as well. The suggestion that anarchy and difference are
somewhat correlated is rather simplistic. It serves to contain, rather than to acknowledge the challenge
that identity politics presents in seeking to eliminate structural and cultural inequality. Anne Orford
suggests that this envisioning of ethnic chaos (among other threats) has been used to justify continued
Western intervention in the Third World in a bid to arrest the 'crisis' and restore the world to international
peace and security. Anne Orford, The Politics of Collective Security, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 373 (1996).
Robert Kaplan alleges that "what is occurring in West Africa and much of the underdeveloped world [is]
the withering away of central governments, the rise.of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked spread
of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war". Kaplan also describes African cities as filled with
hovering, threatening bands of youth "like loose molecules in a very unstable social fluid, a fluid that was
clearly on the verge of igniting". Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy 273 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
February 1994 at 46. Kaplan's apocalyptic (although poorly substantiated) diagnosis typifies the picture
generally presented in the popular media. George Ayittey cites Kaplan's article to support his own
depiction of Africa as "inexorably mired in steaming squalor, misery, deprivation, and chaos. It is in the
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has become key to legitimizing this neo-liberalism as the best, or
perhaps the only alternative to sub-Saharan Africa's predicament.
4
African governments that dare to resist this neo-liberal prescription
of liberal democracy in favor of populist statecraft - which is less
attuned to market governance, but more inclined by popular pressures
to address questions of poverty, dependence, and social division that
may require deviation from these neo-liberal prescriptions - are often
discredited with denigrating epithets such as 'kleptocratic' state;
'vassal' state; 'vampire' state; 'receiver' state, 'prostrate' state,
'fictitious' state, 'collapsed' state, 'predatory' state, 'parasitic' state,
'neo-patrimonial' state, 'lame leviathan' and so on.5 This disparaging
throes of a seemingly incurable crisis". GEORGE B. N. AYITEY, AFRICA IN CHAOS 6, 9 (1998). The
continent is "wracked by a never-ending cycle of civil wars, carnage, chaos and instability... censorship,
persecution, detention, arbitrary seizures of property, corruption, capital flight and tyranny". Id. at 8.
'Government', as it is known in the West, does not exist in much of Africa.... Dishonesty, thievery, and
peculation pervade the public sector .... The African state has been reduced to a mafia-like bazar... it
is a 'state' hijacked by gangsters, crooks, and scoundrels". Id. at 150-51. "What one observes in many
African countries is an 'artificial government' - 'government by deception', run by a phalanx of degreed
bandits sporting Ray-Ban sunglasses and bazookas". Id. at 16. See also Henry A. Giroux, Living
Dangerously: Identity Politics and the New Cultural Racism: Towards A Pedagogy of Representation, 7
CULTURAL SURVIVAL, January 1993, at 2-7; FRANK FUREDI, THE NEW IDEOLOGY OF IMPERIALISM:
RENEWING THE MORAL IMPERATIVE (1994). For a rebuttal of Kaplan's views, see Charles W. Maynes,
The New Pessimism, 100 FOREIGN POLICY Fall 1995, at 33.
4 My analysis is analogical and therefore indebted to Edward Said's analysis of Orientalism as a
Western style of dominating, restructuring and having authority over non-European communities.
EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM (1979). A major research theme in this and related research projects is to
investigate how various cultural and other non-material forms of Western oppression evident in good
governance proposals are: first, carried out in conjunction with Third World elites and, second, how these
cultural and non-material forms of Western (or Euro-American) oppression of the developing world and
the poor are inseparable from national and international economic disparities. See James Thuo Gathii,
EMPOWERING THE WEAK WHILE PROTECTING THE POWERFUL: A CRITIQUE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE
PROPOSALS (a thesis presented to the Committee on Graduate Studies of the Harvard Law School in
partial fulfillment of the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science, April 1999).
5 Larry Diamond argues that without institutional rules and norms (all part of the good governance
proposals), social and policy networks within the state become personalized networks of influence.
Politics become personalized and patronage becomes essential to maintain power. In such a kleptocratic
state, there is widespread predation and plunder of national resources, rent seeking, corruption, favoritism
and oligopolistic entry and exit control. Larry Diamond, The Globalization of Democracy, in GLOBAL
TRANSFORMATION AND THE THIRD WORLD 31 (Robert 0. Slater et al. eds., 1993). However, perhaps
popular presentations of the use of these derogatory terms are the most illustrative since they do not hide
behind technocratic or reformist rationality. For example, William Peterson defines kleptocracy as "the
typical government of the less developed world" where it is rule by thieves, and "in which (rulership)
ambitious persons can better their lives through the perpetuation of government corruption and
inefficiency." William Petersen, The Social Roots of Hunger and Overpopulation, THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
Summer 1982, at 37. In Petersen's view therefore, "the root causes of the worldwide food shortage... are
not lack of agricultural technology, but the weakness or absence of an innovative middle class, and the
correlative dominance of grossly inefficient and corrupt governments. Id. See also Jennifer Hartman,
Note, Government by Thieves: Revealing the Monsters Behind the Kleptocratic Masks, 24 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 157 (1997). The World Bank's report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
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set of imagery betrays the preconceptions that lurk beneath its apparent
trendiness. In at least two specific ways, such preconceptions give
way to notions of chaos, stereotypes, and assumptions about a
particular history or view of post-colonial, sub-Saharan African
statehood6 ; first, in giving credence to the undermining of the African
state's public management and investment of resources, since they
arguably pose dangers to the prevailing balance of rights and
entitlements; and second, in lending legitimacy to placing limits on
democratic controls of the economic sphere.
Good governance's use of this negative and inaccurate imagery
also preempts the assertion of African distinctiveness as a form of
resistance to these standardized, Western prescriptions of neo-liberal
would be an example of a very technocratic report (using criteria such as efficiency) arriving at the same
conclusions of the agrarian crisis in sub-Saharan Africa without using equally disparaging epithets. The
World Bank instead focuses on themes such as efficiency. WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT
IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1981). George B. N. Ayittey argues that the second generation of coup leaders
in Africa after independence (in the 1970's) "soon turned out to be crocodile liberators, Swiss bank
socialists, quack revolutionaries, and grasping kleptocrats. After independence true freedom never came
to much of Africa. Nor did development." GEORGE B. N. AYrrrEY, supra note 4, at 278. See also Robert
Kaplan, supra note 4, at 44. In the United States, political science literature has heavily influenced the
formulation of good governance proposals. Examples of this influential literature includes: John
Waterbury, Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime, 25 WORLD POLITICS 532 (1973);
ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG, PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK AFRICA (1982); THOMAS
CALLAGHY, THE STATE-SOCIETY STRUGGLE IN ZAIRE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1984); RICHARD
SANDBROOK, THE POLITICS OF AFRICAN ECONOMIC STAGNATION (1986); RICHARD JOSEPH,
DEMOCRACY AND PREBENDAL POLITICS IN NIGERIA: THE RISE OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC (1987); JEAN
FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY (Mary Harper et al. trans.,
1993); JEAN FRANCOIS BAYART ET AL., THE CRIMINALIZATION OF THE STATE IN AFRICA (Stephen Ellis,
trans., 1999); Rhoda Howard. The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights take Priority Over Civil
and Political Rights ? Evidence From Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HUM. RTS. Q. 467 (1983). See also Thomas
Callaghy, Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa,
in HEMMED IN: RESPONSES TO AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhall,
eds., 1993); Thomas Callaghy, The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial-Administrative State in
Africa, in AFRICAN STATES IN TRANSITION (Zaki Ergas ed., 1987).
6 Thandika Mkandawire similarly argues that "the socially constructed representation of Africa is
encoded by these epithets which in themselves do not describe something 'out there' whose characteristics
inhere in the epithets but is an outcrop of an underlying discourse", Thandika Mkandawire, The Social
Sciences in Africa: Breaking Local Barriers and Negotiating International Presence, The Bashorun M.
K. 0. Abiola Distinguished Lecture Presented to the 1996 African Studies Association Annual Meeting,
40 AFRICAN STUDIES REVIEW September 1997, at 33. These derogatory epithets are in part a reflection of
what Chandra Mohanty observes to be the work of hegemonic institutions constantly working "through
the power of representations and social practices to produce, codify and even re-write histories of race and
colonialism in the name of difference". Chandra Mohanty, On Race and Voice: Challenges for Liberal
Education in the 1990's, 12 CULTURAL INQUIRY, 184 (1989/90). Also republished in BEYOND A DREAM
DEFERRED: MULTICULTURALISM EDUCATION AND THE POLITICS OF EXCELLENCE 41-65, (Becky W.
Thompson & Sangeeta Tyagi, eds., 1993). An excellent overview of the ways in which Western
anthropological and missionary interpretations of African life and thought introduced distortions for both
Westerners and Africans is V. Y. MUDIMBE, THE INVENTION OF AFRICA: GNOSIS, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE
ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE (1988).
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economic reform and liberal democracy. Moreover, the use of African
distinctiveness is undermined in part through the discrediting of
economic or political projects - justified on the basis of sub-Saharan
Africa's particular historical, colonial and neo-colonial, experience
and its position in the global capitalist order. Through the propagation
of these condescending images of the African State, its politicians, and
its people, the free market and liberal-democratic proposals are
represented as rational and universal projects necessary to replace the
particular character of the nationalist economic and political policies
within the African continent. Central to the promotion of neo-
liberalism, therefore, is the dismissal of Africa's unique and distinctive
appeal, primarily through the evocation of these racially-coded
meanings within the neo-liberal discourse. This ideological critique,
colored by its inherent racial bias, is as fundamental to the 'do-good,
interventionist' agenda as its commitment to imposing liberal
democracy and to reshaping the role of government in the economy.
For example, neo-liberals argue that under the right market conditions,
Africans respond to economic incentives just as 'everyone else' -
presumably those living in Western industrial economies. In this way
neo-liberal market reforms are uncritically justified.
This view of Africans and their lack of economic progress is
uncritical since it is based on a number of problematic assumptions.
First that the lack of economic rationality among Africans is one of the
single most important factors which explains the lack of economic
progress in Africa. This assumption ignores other significant factors
that present barriers to economic progress in Africa. Two of the most
important factors that are ignored are the continent's location in the
international capitalist order and its indebtedness to Western capital.
Second, this view of Africans assumes that poor economic governance
and political authoritarianism necessarily mean that Africans are
denied economic rationality. The assumption that African economic
and political governance necessarily holds African citizens in
economic and political bondage is overstated. This overstatement can
be safely said to be construed so that market governance and liberal
democracy can then be promoted as safe antidotes to Africa's
economic and political problems.
REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICA
Neo-liberal prescriptions for economic and political freedom are
therefore based on these images of failure, lack of political free will
and economic rationality. As further justification for their programs,
good governance advocates remind the African leadership of its
undesirable past; they intimate that if the reforms are not adopted, in
toto, that the African state is destined to return to economic and
political self-destruction. In so doing, neo-liberalism adopts a
universalism hostile to claims of exceptionalism and particularism,
that serves to undercut African claims of distinctiveness as a basis for
selective incorporation or outright rejection of the universalist projects
of free markets and liberal democracy.
This article is an attempt to shed new light on the relationship
between neo-liberalism and African identity. In analyzing the
problems (and failures) of the African economic and political
experience, neo-liberalism has laid the blame exclusively at the feet of
African ideologies, institutions, and practices.7 In so doing, however,
it has completely ignored the significant, external factors such as: the
long, drawn-out, and undeniably detrimental effects of colonialism and
subjugation; the attenuated and adversarial history of the Cold War
that constantly pitted the East against the West with developing
countries such as those of sub-Saharan Africa torn in between; the
continuous flow of costly arms that fueled new and pre-existing
animosities - all in societies more in need of a better future for their
people than war. This neo-liberal strategy of labeling African
criticism or opposition to free market reforms and liberal democratic
prescriptions as opening the door to an undesirable past has ominous
implications: it can only serve to stifle and suppress creative African
participation in its political and economic process. Local African
resistance is being regarded as conservatism and an unwillingness to
7 This argument is thus contrary to a consistent liberal tendency to examine North-South relations
outside the dynamics of race, ideology and Northern industrial and political power. As Ashis Nandy
notes, the histories produced out of the oppression, violence and cultural dislocation of colonialism and
imperialism were "corrupt sciences and psychopathic technologies, which reduced major civilizations to
empty belief." ASHIS NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER
COLONIALISM xii (1983). This new social consciousness in Asia and Africa in effect reduced the West not
merely to "a geographical and temporal entity, but to a psychological category - everywhere in and out of
the West, in structures and in minds. Conventional anti-colonialism may therefore be an apology for
colonization of minds". Id. See also FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Constance
Farrington trans., 1963).
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change its old destructive ways, rather than as a (justifiable) desire to
modify or break loose from these 'non-negotiable' programs.
In addition, by discouraging the use of African identity as a basis
for resistance to neo-liberalism, these proposals seek to seduce the
African democrat to surrender her identity. In writing this article, I
resist this neo-liberal impulse and argue in favor of consolidating the
ideological and practical power of invoking difference (or strategic
exceptionalism/essentialism) as a viable basis for resisting such
hegemonic projects.8 In making this argument, I draw inspiration from
post-colonial African international legal scholarship which invokes the
concept of distinctiveness in order to resist the Eurocentric,
condescending assumptions of international law that were utilized to
foster the colonial subjugation of Africa. In doing so, these scholars
assert a sense of African, personal and historical agency which the
Eurocentric and colonial character of international law has denied and
erased. However, this argument is not simply one of putting a glossy
and positive image on the African persona. Rather, it is a dialectical
project of engaging and overcoming untoward dimensions associated
with that persona while simultaneously seeking to extend, deepen,
transform and democratize it as well as the structural and institutional
environment within which it operates both on the national and
international scene.
Following a strand of argument from critical-race theory, I argue
that the construction of social norms and racial mythology in the neo-
liberal discourse of good governance promotes the interest of global
capital in alliance with its Third World elites.9 The self-serving nature
of good governance literature also seeks to discredit popular
democracy and distributional policies in Africa and the promotion of
markets and foreign investment in particular. !0 Just as critical-race
theorists point out how racist mythologies feed on themselves in the
8 GAYATRI SPIVAK, THE POST COLONIAL CRITIC: INTERVIEWS, STRATEGIES, DIALOGUES (Sarah
Harasym ed., 1991). See GAYATRI SPIVAK, OUTSIDE IN THE TEACHING MACHINE 13 (1993). See also
JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990). (Butler
argues in favor of strategic provisionality.)
9 For a critical race theorist writing in this vein see, Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Second Chronicle:
The Economics and Politics of Race, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1993). For a related article, see Naomi R.
Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REV. 965 (1997).
'o See J. J. Barya, The New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent View From Africa, 24
INST. DEV. STUD. (IDS) BULL. 16 (1993).
REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICA
interest of their promoters, so does good governance find it necessary
to firm up its credibility by using these disparaging images of the
African states. After all, these negative and exaggerated images of a
greedy and self-serving leadership and its dependent-minded citizenry,
only serve to impede African economic and political progress.
Another way in which these images may be said to be self-serving
is their apparent intention "to contain difference without awakening
the dangerous concepts of power and oppression"." In this sense,
good governance entrenches the subordination of sub-Saharan Africa
by criticizing and suppressing democratic forces seeking the
elimination of structural and cultural inequality, and silencing,
policing, and discouraging opposition to the neo-liberal agenda. 
2
However, I resist the temptation to adopt a simplistic posture of
African innocence, authenticity or homogeneity versus White or
Western guilt; instead, my central concern is to investigate how the
African persona has once again emerged so powerfully as a marker of
deficit, thereby justifying neo-liberal reform.
This generalized and adverse portrayal of Africa, Africans and
African leadership does not stand up to close scrutiny. There are
examples of other African countries that have experienced moments of
relative economic success and political peace. For example, Botswana
and Mauritius have both enjoyed sustained economic growth and
political tranquility.' 3 There is therefore no generalized African
1 Joe Kincheloe, Introduction, in HENRY A. GIROUX, LIVING DANGEROUSLY: MULTICULTURALISM
AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 8 (1993).
12 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic argue that in the United States, perceptions that 'American'
culture is under threat are accompanied by a rising waves of nativism. Some of the images most often
invoked in the media and in discussions on 'international' and American national security include violent
ethnic hatreds, warfare, authoritarian dictatorship, terrorism, aggressive nationalism and the drug trade.
Racial and ethnic identity in particular is treated as deviations from the abstract or rational individual who
is able to contain and control personality excesses. These images in turn lend credibility to the portrayal
of the West as being under siege. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefanic, Images of the Outsider in American
Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1270-
1275 (1992).
13 For an interpretation of Botswana's exceptionalism, see PAULINE PETERS, DIVIDING THE
COMMONS: POLITICS, POLICY AND CULTURE IN BOTSWANA (1994). For a discussion of military
takeovers, clientelism and praetorianism in Africa, see SAMUEL DECALO, COUPS AND ARMY RULE IN
AFRICA (1976); CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
(1994); COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY, (I.
William Zartman, ed., 1995). Makau Wa Mutua, Putting Humpty Dumpty Back Together Again: The
Dilemmas of the Post Colonial African State, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 505 (1995) (book review); Why
Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113 (1995).
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experience although the images I discuss in this article seem to suggest
as much.14
II. NEO-LIBERALISM AND ITS DENIGRATION OF PUBLIC
MANAGEMENT OF RESOURCES: JUSTIFYING A SMALL STATE As
ALTERNATIVE AND IDEAL THEORY OF THE AFRICAN STATE
In this part of the article, I explore how neo-liberalism degrades
public or government management of, and investment in, the economy
by its invocation of disparaging references to the African State. This
commitment to specific and narrow definitions of free markets has
been justified as much on the basis of the failures of the post-colonial,
sub-Saharan African State as on any other grounds. An example of the
contempt shown for the African State is the view that it is obsessed
with re-distributive struggles, corruption, and matters of the belly, to
the exclusion of economic growth and development. As a result,
politics in the African State is portrayed as being "driven by these
visceral concerns - no commitment, no morality, no solidarity beyond
the most primordial". 15 As we have seen, neo-liberal criticisms of the
African State and its style of economic development after
independence discredits the positive aspects of governmental
intervention, designed to redress issues such as poverty and economic
inequality. This is because the good governance agenda insists on its
own specific and narrow definitions of free markets, and the result is a
threat to public and potentially beneficial controls of the marketplace.
The next section will therefore discuss how the neo-liberal
commitment to free markets defines public controls of the market
place as threats to its market reform agenda.
A. How Good Governance Discredits State Management of Its
Resources While Loosening Public Controls Over the Economy
The derogatory epithets applied to the postcolonial state in
governance literature assume that distributional and consumption
pressures are an inherent characteristic of its authoritarian politics.
14 Michael Chege, What's Right with Africa?, 93 CURRENT HIST. 193 (1994); Michael Chege,
Remembering Africa, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AMERICA & THE WORLD 1991/92, at 146.
15 Thandika Mkandawire, supra note 6, at 3 1.
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Consequently, restraining these distributional pressures in favor of
productive investment is regarded as central to the neo-liberal
economic reform agenda. Thus, distributional politics must be
upstaged by the "ascendance of 'economic logic' in policy making". 16
Another aspect of the economic reform agenda is the limitation of
the African State's discretionary control over resources, since,
according to the agenda, experience has shown that it "encourages
pervasive regulatory intervention and arbitrary bureaucratic meddling
in markets. The incessant unpredictable budgetary demands of
patronage politics subvert accountability and probity in state
finance". 17  This same literature describes the African State as
imprisoned by rapacious forces in all spheres of the economy,
particularly in agriculture and industry. According to this view, these
same self-destructive forces permeate the entire fabric of the economy
as they seek to secure and/or maintain opportunities for access to
patronage, resources and rent seeking.' 8 It is this predatory 'dynamic'
that in turn undermines the emergence of 'autonomous domestic
capitalist forces'. 19 African politics is depicted as nothing less than a
'dynamic' of securing and protecting avenues to largesse! 20
16 Peter M. Lewis, Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa: The Quest for a Politics of
Development, 49 WORLD POLITICS 92, 124 (1996) (book review) quoting Thomas Callaghy, Political
Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa, supra note 5.
17 Peter M. Lewis, supra note 16, at 100.
'8 See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE (1997). Robert Bates is a leading example of a rational choice approach in the interpretation
of economic performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. See ROBERT H. BATES, ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF RURAL AFRICA (1983); ROBERT H. BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA:
THE POLITICAL BASIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICIES (1981). See also, Howard Stein and Ernest J. Wilson
l1, Robert Bates, Rational Choice and the Political Economy of Development in Africa, 21 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1033 (1993); M. Bienefeld, Analysing the Politics of African State Policy: Some Thoughts
on Robert Bates' Work, 17 INST. DEv. STUD. (IDS) BULL. 1 (1986); Michael Chege, Time to Put Away the
Heroic Stereotypes, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Jan. 3, 1997, at 14 (book review). See also, LARS
UDEHN, THE LIMITS OF PUBLIC CHOICE: A SOCIOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF
POLITICS 181 (1996); DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE: A
CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (1994).
" Peter M. Lewis, supra note 16, at 101.
2o For example, see JEAN FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY,
supra note 6. However, Thandika Mkandawire argues that the problems of accumulation (or of acquiring
largesse) are smaller relative to capital flight. In his view, attempts to get rid of corruption paradoxically
turn into a perverse incentive - ill-gotten wealth is shuttled from the continent into the West for
safekeeping. Thandika Mkandawire, Beyond Crisis: Towards Democratic States in Africa (Paper
presented at the Council for the Development of Social Science research in Africa, 1995). See also
Michael Chege, Where the Goat Eats, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Feb. 9, 1996, at 4845 (book review
of JEAN FRANCOIS BAYART, THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF THE BELLY (1993) and other titles).
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The ascendance of the agenda of limiting state management and
investment of resources in sub-Saharan Africa is therefore
accompanied by a simultaneous deprecation of the African State as a
corrupt feudal order. As such, these states are regarded as weak or
inefficient, to the extent that they are unable to provide an adequate
infrastructure, a predictable legal framework, and sound economic and
financial policies. These states are thus characterized by their
[c]apricious mismanagement, weak judicial systems, inefficiency,
and pervasive corruption in the public sector, as well as their
inability to prevent widespread evasion of laws and regulations.
Africa's bloated and overextended state is like a 'lame leviathan',
unable to provide stable and effective political and economic
governance.
21
In my view, it is not accidental that this negative portrayal of the
post-colonial, African state discredits populist statecraft committed to
social welfare guarantees which are considered inconsistent with the
neo-liberal prescriptions of market governance, a small state or
government that possesses little or no power of distribution, and liberal
democracy.
The disparaging images of the post colonial African State lurk
within neo-liberal accounts of the post colonial sub-Saharan African
State in at least three ways. First, in appropriately discrediting
predatory politics; second, in simultaneously discrediting all forms of
public management of resources, especially those sensitive to
questions of poverty, dependence and social division that may require
deviation from the neo-liberal prescriptions of market governance; and
third, in the contemptuous portrayal of the African state that strongly
resonates as a justification for the neo-liberal small state whose role is
primarily confined to providing a framework for the rule of law,
protection and enforcement of property rights and enforcement of
contracts.
The capacity building (or simply state capacity) dimension of the
World Bank's good governance agenda is based on this idea of a small
2' Shalendra D. Sharma, The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF., Winter/Spring 1996, at 165, 168 (book review).
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efficient state with weakened powers of resource allocation. 22 The
idea of a state with weakened powers of allocation arises from a
'generalized contempt for public management of resources' and
enterprise that characterizes the neo-liberal discourse. 23  Capacity
building is preoccupied with the necessity of a highly competent
bureaucracy (referring to administrative and technical competencies,
presumably to replace the scarce administrative and technical
resources of sub-Saharan African public sectors) as a key factor in the
implementation of neo-liberal economic reform.
The World Bank's good governance agenda attributes the present
economic crisis of sub-Saharan Africa to past political arbitrariness
and economic inefficiency (or predatory politics in other literature on
governance) of structures of governance. Capacity building connotes
improving the government's ability to effectively manage its resources
for development. Capacity building is seen as the antidote to the
dismal performance of sub-Saharan African economies in good
governance literature, especially that promoted by the World Bank. In
reality, this theme of capacity building really refers to the neo-liberal
commitment to a small and efficient state, providing a framework for
market governance, as opposed to public management of the economy.
The illegitimacy of the state's role in managing the economy is
exaggerated by the stigmatization of those things the neo-liberals do
not believe the state should be managing. The state is defined as
corrupt and inefficient especially in cases involving regulatory controls
of the economy. In defining state involvement in the economy as
invariably inimical to the efficient use of resources (unless such
intervention was market supporting), this argument lays the basis for
market reforms or good governance proposals as antidotes to
inefficient allocation of resources through the state. Similarly, legal
regimes in these states came to be regarded as the root of corrupt and
inefficient governance. One major feature of good governance
proposals is therefore that of seeking to eliminate state capacities that
22 WORLD BANK, MANAGING DEVELOPMENT: THE GOVERNANCE DIMENSION - A DISCUSSION
PAPER; WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT supra note 3; WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE:
THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 3. See also, MAMADOU DIA, A GOVERNANCE APPROACH
TO CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1993); Frischtak Leila, Governance and Economic
Reform in Developing Countries (World Bank Technical Paper No. 254, 1994).
23 HENRY VELTMEYER Er AL., NEO-LIBERALISM AND CLASS CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 69 (1997).
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promote corruption and inefficiency and to build new capacities that
promote development and economic growth.
The rest of this section will address the manner in which the
understandable criticism of predatory politics or past arbitrariness and
inefficiency par the World Bank, has simultaneously served to
discredit all or most forms of public management of resources for
social welfare. This criticism is over-inclusive to the extent to which it
undermines the African State's pursuit of distributional policies
intended to address poverty, dependence and social division as
illegitimate interventions in the economy, under the contemptuous
label of predatory politics. 24  Prior to the debt crisis, both the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported or
acquiesced to the pursuit of interventionist policies, such as import
substitution and other economic programs (such as public education
and health) that, it was argued, required government involvement in
the economy.
25
24 James Ferguson, From African Socialism to Scientific Capitalism: Reflections on the Legitimation
Crisis in IMF-Ruled Africa, in DEBATING DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE: INSTITUTIONAL AND POPULAR
PERSPECTIVES, 137 (David B. Moore & Gerald J. Schmitz, eds., 1995). The World Bank argues that the
"public funds required for the provision of services in this traditional fashion [free basic services such as
sanitation, safe water, modem health care, and education] exceed by far what governments are able to
generate now or are likely to generate in the next several decades". WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED
DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE, supra note 6, at 43. This analysis
says nothing of the overriding imperative in policy reform to generate revenue for debt repayment at the
expense of all other needs for revenue. In addition, as Ferguson notes presumes that "African consumers
are willing to give up other expenditures to buy such services as bus transport, irrigation water, health
care, and education." No attention is given to those who can hardly afford these services, even granted
that one agrees with the Bank's analysis on the need to privatize especially those services and do away
with those subsidies enjoyed by a few at the expense of the majority. Teresa Hayter and Catherine
Watson note that the "Bank's predilections clearly lie in the direction of the neo-classical principles of
full-cost recovery and market pricing, together with the view that those who can pay, should pay, rather
than the principle of free provision of free services for all". TERESA HAYTER & CATHERINE WATSON,
AID: RHETORIC AND REALITY 140 (1985). The Bank's rationale for preferring market as opposed to
government determination of prices is based on the view that markets allow competition and result in
gains in efficiency. The Bank hence advocates the removal of subsidies and price controls since these are
regarded as undesirable 'distortions'. Such reforms are also thought of as desirable since they reduce
government spending, a 'virtue' promoted by these institutions, notwithstanding the resulting rise in prices
of essential commodities especially, for the poor.
2 Nicholas Stem & Francisco Ferreira, supra note I, at 537-47.
REPRESENTATIONS OF AFRICA
B. Background to Postcolonial African State Interventionist Policies,
Both as a Production Strategy and as a Commitment to Distributive
Justice
While it may be true that corruption, mismanagement and
inefficient economic governance have characterized postcolonial
African states, the distributional policies referred to above have been a
central and positive part of a postcolonial commitment to equality and
justice. Undoubtedly, predatory politics have betrayed this
commitment, but it is mistaken to discredit or submerge distributional
justice with the discredited predatory politics or arbitrary and
inefficient governance of post colonial African states. In addition, it is
important to point out that state involvement in the economy was not
simply justified on the basis of a commitment to distributional justice,
but rather as a distinctive view of production and investment. This
distinctive view of state involvement in production and investment has
been most recently successful in Northeast and Southeast Asia,
although the World Bank and the IMF do not recommend it to
Africa.26
In the immediate postcolonial period, nearly all sub-Saharan
African governments rejected limited constitutional governments and
market economies as inadequate to manage the widespread inequalities
produced under colonial rule, and the massive task of nation building
in diverse ethnic and religious groups that had lived under the divide
and rule policies of colonial governors.
This postcolonial commitment was also echoed in the Keynesian
consensus (which was by no means a homogeneous view of thought
and practice)27 of the post World War II period, which was adopted by
26 Neo-liberal prescriptions do not prescribe a production strategy for African states as such. Instead,
its prescriptions are designed to ensure a global system of free movement of capital as a precondition for
its optimal allocation. Hence the prescriptions recommend the deregulation of the economy and the
privatization of state owned firms. These proposals ignore how successful economies in East Asia were
accompanied by heavy state involvement in allocation of credit subject to performance standards. This is
a path African states could very well follow but it is a foreclosed alternative in the good governance
proposals. See ALICE H. AMSDEN, ASIA'S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIzATION
(1989). For an articulation of this view in the African context, see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
See also Alice H. Amsden, Why Isn't the World Bank Experimenting with the East Asian Model to
Develop?: Review of the East Asian Miracle," 22 WORLD DEV. 627 (1994).2
-For a treatment of the heterogeneous character of the Keynesian 'consensus' during both its
heyday and crisis, see GEOFFREY PILLING, THE CRISIS OF KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS: A MARXIST VIEW
(1986).
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economic managers particularly in Western Europe, but was also an
influential inspiration of the economic programs of several Western
oriented sub-Saharan African economies.2 8  The attraction of
Keynesianism was that it could be mobilized to give credibility to the
use of fiscal policy to remove inequalities of wealth while, at the same
time, boosting consumption through re-distributive measures such as
public works.29  In other words, there was a convergence in the
structuralist 30/nationalist consensus of the desirability of direct
government control of the economy adopted by postcolonial
governments and the goals of social democracy or the welfare state as
instituted in Western Europe during the inter-war period. The
structuralists/nationalists held the belief that the newly independent
governments of sub-Saharan Africa should correct the flaws of the
market economy so that prosperity and equality would not be solely
dependent on the market. This view was partly inspired by anti-
colonial struggles that rejected a, reduced role for the state in the
economy.3 1 In addition, African nationalist leadership invoked notions
28 Peter A. Hall, The Political Power q" Economic Ideas: Keynesianism Across Nations, 1989, in
THE POLICY CONSEQUENCES OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (Harold Wattel cd., 1985).
29 Keynesian economics served to justify deficit spending to combat high unemployment and excess
capacity without crowding out other production. Hence, Keynesian economics departed from classical or
Marshallian economics which regards resolving unemployment through public works programs as a
means of diverting savings that would otherwise got to private investment. Classical economics is thus
based on a spontaneously adjusting mechanism (the interest rate) that would bring into equilibrium the
quantity of savings supplied through foregone consumption (savings) and the quantity of investment
demanded by entrepreneurs.
3o Structuralism is an economic view of the world identified for regarding change in the international
economic order in favor of developing countries through the free movement of capital and goods as
inhibited by obstacles, constraints and bottlenecks. This view therefore holds that, to overcome these
hurdles, various forms of direct government control are necessary to promote economic development.
Structuralists consider transforming the structural context as a prerequisite for real development.
31 From the late 1950's to the late 1960's, Western economists, just like African nationalists, thought
that the free market was unsuited for newly independent African countries. For a sampling of how these
development economists departed from classical economics in their policy prescriptions, see ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, ESSAYS IN TRESPASSING: ECONOMICS TO POLITICS AND BEYOND (1981) (especially the
chapter on "The Rise and Decline of Development Economics".) Some of the most cited critiques of state
involvement in the economy written during the ascendant moment of development economics in the
1960's and 1970's were by Peter Bauer. See PETER BAUER, WEST AFRICAN TRADE (1963); A DISSENT ON
DEVELOPMENT (1976); REALITY AND RHETORIC (1984). The critique of development economics
displaced development economics as a dirigiste dogma. Some of the leading attacks on development
economics (which advocated for a very limited role for government and an extended role for markets in
development) in this period were: DEPAAK LAL, THE POVERTY OF DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS (1984);
IAN LITTLE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1982); BELA BALASSA, STUDIES IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION
(1967); ANNE 0. KRUEGER, DEVELOPMENT WITH TRADE (1988). Other researchers that had, for a long
time, marshaled evidence on the failure of the state, which in effect justified free market reforms in
developing countries, include the trade economist Jagdish Bhagwati. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Trade
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of African socialism predicated on solidaristic and communitarian
ideals as an anti-colonial engagement with the coercive realities of the
rugged individualism embedded in dominant visions of the liberal
international economic order.3 2  Other reasons why the newly
independent countries in the post-World War II era rejected free
markets as an option included the export pessimism experienced in
developed countries and the success of the Soviet Union which,
through economic planning, despite being a relatively underdeveloped
country, had become a great power in just one generation.
Furthermore, the leadership's desire to promote faith in the need to
industrialize, the availability of cheap and abundant labor, and
Liberalization among LDC's, Trade Theory and GATT Rules, in VALUE, CAPITAL AND GROWTH: PAPERS
IN HONOR OF SIR JOHN HICKS (J. N. Wolfe ed., 1968). Together, the work of these academics (perhaps
unwittingly) echoed the dominant conservative economic policies of the Thatcher and Reagan
governments across the Atlantic in two Northern industrial economies, while the Bretton Woods
institutions and the GATT/WTO simultaneously imposed free market reforms on sub-Saharan African
economies. The work of these academics also simultaneously displaced the paradigm of development that
had been advocated by development economists with widespread acceptability only a few years before.
32 Countries such as Ethiopia under Emperor Haile Selassie, Ghana under Nkuruma, Guinea under
Sekou Toure and Tanzania under Nyerere initially adopted a philosophy of African socialism that
presumed traditional African societies would accommodate socialism 'naturally' without conflict or
tension, only to revise this approach and adopt variations of scientific socialism (such as Leninist
Marxism) as experience proved them wrong. For a review, see SOCIALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: A
NEW ASSESSMENT (Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, eds., 1979). In the Kenyan case, see
REPUBLIC OF KENYA, AFRICAN SOCIALISM AND ITS APPLICATION TO PLANNING IN KENYA (Sessional
Paper Number 10. 1965). This document outlined Kenya's brand of African socialism to include:
political equality; social justice; human dignity including freedom of conscience; freedom from want,
disease and exploitation; equal opportunities; and growing per capita income, equitably distributed. This
so-called socialist paper was drafted by an American economist serving as a consultant, perhaps
illustrating the sheer manipulability of socialist rhetoric to fit the nationalist coalition within the Kenyatta
government that was basically an accumulating class within the strictures of a neo-colonial capitalist
economy in the periphery. A more radical group within the ruling Kenya African National Union
(KANU) however prescribed nationalization of property as a means of ensuring economic independence
and greater Africanization of commerce. See BILDAD KAGGIA, ROOTS OF FREEDOM: 1921-1963 (1975);
JARAMOGI OGINGA-ODINGA, NOT YET UHURU (1968). Both Odinga and Kaggia lament the betrayal of
the radical nationalist goals by the Kenyatta government by serving the wealthy elite at the expense of the
poor and peripheral communities. See also TOWARDS SOCIALISM IN TANZANIA (B. U. Mwansasu &
Cranford Pratt, eds., 1979); AHMED MOHIDDIN, AFRICAN SOCIALISM IN TWO COUNTRIES (1980); JULIUS
K. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM (1968); Ujamaa: The Basis of African Socialism, in JULIUS K.
NYERERE, FREEDOM AND UNITY (1967); THE ARUSHA DECLARATION AFTER TEN YEARS (1979);
POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY IN KENYA AND TANZANIA (Joel D. Barkan, ed., 1984); Michael Chege,
Swapping Development Strategies: Kenya and Tanzania After Their Founding Fathers, in POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEW REALISM IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 247 (David E. Apter & Carl G.
Rosberg eds., 1994); P. Anyang' Nyongo, State and Society Relations in Kenya: The Disintegration of the
Nationalist Coalitions and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism, 1963-1978, 88 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
229 (1989).
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multinational corporations 33 all contributed to the newly independent
state's desire to take a more active role 
in the economy.3W
In marked contrast to the neo-liberal model of the small state, the
post-World War II Keynesian consensus assigned the government a
major role in enterprise and public management of resources. A key
characteristic of Keynesian economics was its contribution to
explaining how to calculate the size of the national income and levels
of unemployment, inflation and growth. Briefly, Maynard Keynes'
contribution to the study of national income was in part the theory that
income determination was predicated upon a perception of investment
demand that had a multiplier effect on consumption and economic
output as determined by the level of demand. 35  As such, Keynes re-
oriented the earlier Marshallian analysis that focused primarily on the
study of marginal utilities and costs in price determination in
individual markets. In contrast, Keynes focused on the interaction of
flows of national savings and investment that determine the level of
national output and employment. Keynesian analysis, therefore,
shifted attention from the marginalist view of micro-maximization -
moving the understanding of motivation from an individual to a group-
centered perception of behavior. Moreover, he rejected the theory that
the price mechanism was a pre-condition for the determination and
existence of economic order.
Through its focus on the study of the business cycle,
Keynesianism, unlike "marginalism", also introduced the concepts of
33 See, e.g., Kwame Nkurumah. Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965).
3 W. Arthur Lewis, Economic Development With Unlimited Supplies of Labor, in THE ECONOMICS
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT (A. N. Agarwala & S. P. Singh eds., 1958); Hollis Chenery, Comparative
Advantage and Development Policy, in STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 275 (World Bank,
1979). For a radical critique of these theories of underdevelopment (albeit these were more to the left of
the classical modernization theories that presupposed development was the transition from traditional to
modern society), see SAMIR AMIN, ACCUMULATION ON A WORLD SCALE: A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY
OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT, (Brian Pearce, trans., 1974) (Especially chapter one).
35 One of his seminal contributions was, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936). For his collected writings see, THE COLLECTED WRITINGS
OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES (Austin Robinson ed., 1971). Alfred Marshall, by contrast, whose work is
credited with the marginalist revolution that preceded the Keynesian consensus, focused on the price
determination of capital and consumption goods. His work ignored a major Keynesian insight, the
distinction between consumption and investment with respect to their respective demanders. In
Marshall's view, momentum and progress of the economy arose from utility maximization, a natural
tendency for the movement or expansion of economic life, except when this natural tendency of economic
expansion was 'paralyzed'. Robert Heilbroner & William Milberg, The Crisis of Vision in Modem
Economic Thought (1995).
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uncertainty and contingency (market failure) as part of the social
experience. Instead of perceiving economic action and order as the
result of spontaneity or law-like explanations - as in the marginalist
view, where price analysis was regarded as an order-bestowing
process, or economics as an ordering calculus - Keynesianism looked
to motivations, such as precaution, foresight, calculation,
shortsightedness, ostentation, and extravagance. This shift from
utility-maximization to propensities expanded the possibility for
empirical investigation of consumption, income ratios, interest rates,
investment, expenditure, and so on, that were limited under the
assumptions of marginalism or Marshallian analysis. The study of
market failure and its relationship to unemployment laid the
foundation for utilizing the government as an active generator of
economic activity. Under Keynesianism, then, economic policy was
understood not so much as being subject to the spontaneous direction
or whims of the market but rather as a reflection of socio-economic
considerations.36
Development economists, or structuralists, who studied
postcolonial economies concurred with the Keynesian consensus and
nationalist leadership (especially in countries allied to the West) that
addressing social and economic problems required placing economic
management in the hands of the state.37 The structuralists went even
further than the Keynesians; they argued that in the postcolonial
context, great socio-economic questions - such as poverty,
powerlessness, massive income inequalities, 'natural' monopolies, pre-
capitalist traditions, and factor immobility - could not be surrendered
to the market. It was also important for the state to become involved,
not only to help determine the course of social change and to chart and
implement a strategy for rapid economic growth, but also to improve
income distribution, the redistribution of assets and, through price and
wage controls, to manipulate the return to different types of labor and
capital controls.38 Today, structuralists still argue against unrestricted,
free trade for developing countries, especially in view of the export
pessimism of the Great Depression and the post-World War II era,
3 This and the preceding paragraph closely tracks ROBERT HEILBRONER & WILLIAM MILBERG, id.
37 For a definition of the structuralists, see supra note 3 1.3
8 See MICHAEL TODARO, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD (1985); GERALD MIEIR,
LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1986).
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although selective interpretations of the success of the East-Asian
economies through growth in their exports is often cited as support for
the opposite view.39
C. Neo-Liberalism: Reversing State Interventionist Policies -
Imposing the Small State as Alternative Production and
Distributional Model
The idea of a small, efficient state is in part a reversal of the
critical role that the state played in both the Keynesian and the
structuralist/nationalist consensus. Good governance, as embraced by
the Bretton Woods institutions in particular, now embraces the neo-
liberal approach for the resolution of social problems. Just as in
marginalism and Marshallian analysis, this neo-liberal approach
focuses on individual choices, on the microcosm; government
involvement in the economy not only undermines the impartiality of
the invisible hand of the market place, but individual liberty as well.
This methodology has been re-introduced mainly through public-
choice inspired analysis. 40 Public-choice theorists hold that the needs
of citizens can best be met through the market place, except perhaps
for essential public goods. In this view, very specific notions of the
market, or capitalism, comprise the most efficient system of allocating
resources, while liberal democracy is the political regime that best
suits the dignity of all citizens. Democracy, within the neo-liberal
view, is deemed to be simply a method for the selection of
government, a view that I will contest in the third part of this paper.
Neo-liberal economics, in fact, adopts the Marshallian notion of
spontaneity; as a result of the unintended actions of individuals, the
price mechanism can generate an economic order. However, the
theory goes even further by contending that the market (or price
39 One of the best articulations of the structuralist view to come from Africa is from the ECONOMIC
COMMISSION FOR AFRICA, AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE TO STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES (AAF-
SAP): A FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSFORMATION AND RECOVERY (Apr. 10, 1989). For a friendly critique
of this structuralist view, see MICHAEL BARRATT BROWN, AFRICA'S CHOICES AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF
THE WORLD BANK 179-87 (1995). See also note 27 and accompanying text.
40 Robert Heilbroner and William Milberg arghe that within macro-economic thinking at the present
time, there has been a series of efforts to re-establish neo-classical thought or Marshallian analysis as the
dominant approach to issues of income determination, unemployment, inflation and growth. ROBERT
HEILBRONER & WILLIAM MILBERG, supra note 35.
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mechanism) bestows not only economic order but political order as
well. Moreover, the literature on good governance adopts the theories
of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman to support their contention
that the market provides a spontaneous basis for economic and
political order. According to Hayek, the market produces a special
kind of spontaneous order "through people acting within the rules of
the laws of property, tort and contract".4 ' In his view, the role of
government is specific: to provide a framework for the rule of law
within which individual freedom could be realized. His view of
government is therefore a limited one, confined to providing only
those goods that the market could not efficiently provide. The market
is a pre-condition of this individualism that is broadly associated with
public-choice approaches and regards the state as the sum of its
individual members acting collectively.42 Thus, spontaneous order
emerges as individuals in the marketplace enter into voluntary
exchanges with each another.
This public-choice concept of the state is a fundamental departure
from the Keynesian welfare-state consensus, or that of the postcolonial
structuralist view upheld by development economists. According to
these economists, the state existed not as a result of spontaneous order,
but rather of conscious social construction designed for the welfare of
society. 43 In contrast, neo-liberals view the market not only as "the
best mechanism for resource allocation, but also as the best
mechanism for political decision making and for social interaction
generally; the yardstick with which to measure the value of all social
institutions". 44 This prescription of a limited state is based on the
proclaimed supremacy of the market and individual freedom; the
market becomes the linchpin, not only because it maximizes individual
freedom but it also makes individual choice possible. By adopting
some of the basic tenets of public-choice theory, neo-liberalism
41 Perhaps the best example is WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR CHANGE, supra note 5. For a critique of the Marshallian view and its
Hayekian assumptions in the African context, see KIDANE MENGISTEAB, GLOBALIZATION AND
AUTOCENTRICITY IN AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT IN THE 21" CENTURY, especially at 127-50 (1996).
42 C. B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM, HOBBES TO LOCKE
(1962).
43 Udehn reminds us that public choice was a movement against welfare economics. LARS UDEHN,
supra note 18, at 18 1.
44 David Beetham, Four Theorems About the Market and Democracy, 23 EURO. J. POL. RES. 187,
188 (1993).
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concludes that individual choice is not possible under any conditions
except those of the market.
This view emanates from the well-known forerunner of public-
choice theory - the Arrow Theorem - that holds that "no voting rule
[or democracy] can transform the preferences of individuals into a
consistent set of preferences for the community as a whole".,5  This
theory further rejects the principle that social welfare or collective
choices can be derived from the preferences of individuals. If social
welfare or collective choices could be derived in that fashion, the
argument continues, then they would merely "reflect the preference of
the welfare economist himself".46 In sum, because unanimity is
impossible where people have different preferences, Arrow's Theorem
rejects, in toto, the possibility of social welfare. 47 The public-choice
approach derived its concept of spontaneous order directly from
Arrow's Theorem. It therefore follows, according to public-choice
advocates, that democracy must be imposed or dictatorial. After all,
there is no way to aggregate individual preferences into social choice.
Not even the market, which is itself a spontaneous order, is a
mechanism for social choice.
The implications of the neo-liberal prescription - that markets are
superior to democracy in resource-allocation/enterprise, and in
creating social, political and economic order - are worrisome to the
social democrat. First, because neo-liberalism embraces a radical
individualism opposed to popular sovereignty. In this view,
45 LARS UDEHN, supra note 18, at 179. Arrow's theorem, also known as the general possibility
theorem, holds that: "if we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only
methods of passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will
be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial." KENNETH
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 59 (195 1). See also DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF
COMMITrEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
46 LARS UDEHN, supra note 18. at 179. The only case under which there could be unanimous
consent, according to this argument, is in the case of provision of public goods, where it would be possible
to change the otherwise efficient workings of the market. Social choice, therefore, should be minimized to
situations of unanimous choice. Id.
47 Jurgen Habermas proposes an alternative and preferable way of thinking about how to reach
agreement in society. In his view. communicative action or mutual understanding can be promoted since
it is possible to change people's preferences and beliefs through argument and debate between free and
equal citizens in a public sphere. However, preconditions for communicative action rarely obtain in many
sub-Saharan African countries, although this by no means discredits communicative action or any radical
democratic alternative to the public choice critique of democracy. JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION. (VOL. I: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY; VOL. 2:
LiFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON) (1981).
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individuals are held to have fixed and unchanging preferences that can
only find their fullest expression in a market society. Second, because
individual liberty is conceived of as limiting state authority within a
regime of rules for property, tort and contract. And third, because the
market is superior to democracy as a method of resource allocation,
liberty trumps other values such as equality, social security and re-
distributive policies.
48
Neo-liberalism is also hostile to social spending because it is
regarded as an inefficient cost to the economy, it promotes dependence
and it represents a departure from the structuralist/nationalist and
Keynesian welfare state consensus, all of which acknowledge that
social spending is a legitimate policy to rectify disadvantage. Since,
according to this theory, social spending endangers individual liberty,
the preferred method is for the market to allocate/invest resources for
their most efficient use, thus obviating the need for any distributive
role.49
In general, while the neo-liberal agenda is replete with examples of
using safety nets to help the poor, the needy, and the so-called losers in
the adjustment process, it is not inaccurate to conclude that it is
opposed to all forms of wealth redistribution. In fact Hayek, whose
work is often used to justify neo-liberalism, subscribes to the view that
justice is merely procedural. He further avers that intervention in the
economy, for the purpose of promoting social justice, simply
undermines 'the justice of the market', resulting in the confiscation of
wealth from the more successful; prolonging the dependence of the
needy; entrenching 'the special powers of organized interest groups',
and eventually overriding individual freedom. 50  In its beginning
phases during the early 80's, neo-liberalism was heavily criticized for
failing to consider the 'human dimension' and thus failing to work
towards the reduction of social dislocation and suffering in several
developing countries.51 The social, economic and political activism
" J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY. ch. 11 (1979).
49 An excellent critique of this shortcoming in the context of economic restructuring is included in
Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Gender and Distribution in the Legal Structures of Market
Reform (1998) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard Law School)
50 Christopher Pierson, Democracy, Markets and Capital: Are There Necessary Economic Limits to
Democracy, in PROSPECTS'FOR DEMOCRACY: NORTH. SOUTH, EAST. WEST 181 (David Held, ed., 1993).
s UNICEF commissioned one of the major mainstream critiques of IMF austerity programs.
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popularly known as the African food riots and resultant social activist
movements in Latin America coincided with the implementation of the
harshest elements of the free-market system throughout the 80's and
into the 90's.52  It is therefore not unexpected that, although many
aspects of the neo-liberal reforms are socially disadvantageous (as in
the reduction of social spending in education, health and public
housing), these reforms incorporate social safety nets which provide
temporarily for those who lose out the most. In effect, these safety
nets serve to cushion the potentially damaging impact of the reform
process and, as a result, the inevitable protests.5 3 Moreover, social
PROTECTING THE VULNERABLE AND PROMOTING GROWTH (1987). See also UNDP, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT (1993). The Bretton Woods institutions tacked on social safety nets within the
strictures of the neo-liberal agenda, without fundamentally re-altering it, following critizism of the
program's inattention to social justice issues. For example, the IMF notes that while "fiscal policy is a
key avenue for dealing with social aspects of adjustment, the (IMF's) Interim Committee also places
importance to improving the quality and composition of fiscal adjustment, by reducing unproductive
spending while ensuring adequate basic investment in infrastructure." IMF, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE
IMF's POLICY DIALOGUE I (Aug., 1997), quoting IMF, DECLARATION ON A PARTNERSHIP FOR A
SUSTAINABLE GLOBAL GROWTH (1996). According to the IMF, it is a fact that "an economy ridden with
imbalances and rigidities to a high quality growth path is always difficult. Some policies that are
necessary for this transition may hurt some of the society's vulnerable groups in the short run. With the
governments concerned, the IMF is making serious efforts to contain and mitigate such adverse effects
and to introduce appropriate social safety net measures .... Fiscal adjustment is critical in the design of
IMF-supported adjustment programs and in its policy advice on social issues. The composition of
government expenditures reflects social priorities and such expenditures are being targeted more
specifically to meet the needs of the poor. In the process, the IMF maintains a dialogue with the World
Bank and United Nations agencies to identify key areas where public expenditure must be maintained or
even increased if necessary - and where nonproductive spending (including military spending) can be
reduced - so that investments in human capital, such as basic health care and primary education are not
displaced", IMF, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS, at 2. For a review of how the Bretton Woods institutions have re-
oriented the neo-liberal agenda to address political and intellectual challenges, see Eboe Hutchful,
Adjustment In Africa And Fifty Years Of Bretton Woods Institutions: Change or Consolidation, XVI
CANADIAN JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 412 (1995). For a statement of the continuing revision
of structural adjustment programs, see World Bank, Moving Forward Where There is Consensus &
Rethinking Adjustment Where There is Less Success-And Less Consensus, in ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA:
REFORMS, RESULTS AND THE ROAD AHEAD 184-208 (1994). For a statement of the revised statement of
the Washington consensus incorporating a social dimension, see John Williamson, The Emerging
Development Consensus, in GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT (Barbara Stallings, ed., 1995), (initially published in Global Studies Program,
University of Wisconsin, Working Paper No. 5 in the Series on Development at A Crossroads: Uncertain
Paths to Sustainability, September 1994).
52 See Susan Eckstein, Power and Popular Protest in Latin America, in POWER AND POPULAR
PROTEST: LATIN AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS. (Susan Eckstein, ed., 1989); John Walton, Debt,
Protest and the State in Latin America, in Eckstein, POWER AND POPULAR PROTEST, id. at 329. For an
account of the complexity of African social movements (discounting simplifications of protests as merely
cultural, religious or apolitical) see M. Mamdani, T. Mkandawire and Wamba-dia-Wamba, Social
Movements. Social Transformation And the Struggle for Democracy in Africa, Working Paper No. 1/88,
CODESRIA, 1988.
53 M. de Larosiere, then Managing Director of the IMF, in a speech to ECOSOC, 4 July, 1986, for
example, stated that "programmes of adjustment cannot be effective unless they command the support of
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safety nets are deemed to be an acceptable response since they (the
social safety nets) do not shake up the balance of political and
economic power in society54, and especially since they do not require
radical surgery in the structural relations of wealth and power. As
such, they are attractive both to the local elites and Western capital.55
In short, these safety nets are left beyond public or democratic control
since, according to the neo-liberal prescriptions, legislatures cannot be
trusted to redistribute resources. After all, the liberal democratic
component of neo-liberal proposals confines democratic practices to
the political sphere without simultaneously extending them to the
economic sphere, where peoples' most fundamental interests,
especially in deeply unequal societies, are constituted.56 We now turn
to the limitations of the liberal democratic project as embraced in neo-
liberal or good governance proposals.
III. THE AUTONOMOUS STATE AND THE INSULATION OF NEO-
LIBERALISM FROM POPULAR FORCES
As we have seen, neo-liberalism is as obsessed with the concept of
individual liberty as it is uncomfortable with popular sovereignty and
state intervention in the economy. It fears that governmental
intervention in the economy only leads to out-of-control spending,
budget deficits, and other vices which, unless held in check, would
inevitably undermine individual freedom. In one extreme version,
government and of public opinion. Yet this support will be progressively harder to obtain without some
payoff in terms of growth while human conditions are deteriorating". Advocates for social and economic
rights argued that "political democracy without a safety net for the vulnerable and the weak curtails and
impairs the principle of social justice and does not meet the standards and the scope of the international
bill of rights", See, Theo Van Boven, Human Rights and Rights of Peoples, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 470 (1995);
See also tan Martin, The New World Order: Opportunity or Threat for Human Rights (A lecture by the
Edward Smith visiting fellow presented by the Harvtrd Law School Human Rights Program, 1993).
54 According to Henry Veltmeyer, James Petras and Steve Vieux, one of the major aims of structural
adjustment programs is to enable indebted low income countries to service their external debt, without
regard to social welfare, resulting in massive transfers of resources from low income developing countries
to high income countries. HENRY VELTMEYER ET AL., supra note 23, at 16. In this context, social safety
nets are an important padding against social protest in response to government withdrawal from providing
important social support, in areas such as education and health, since they involve minimal expenditure
compared to providing free education and health like was the case before.
55 Kerry Rittich, argues that neo-liberalism is a hodge potch of proposals that are internally
inconsistent as well as contradictory with each other. It is therefore unsurprising that social safety nets
could be part of the programmatic proposals of neo-liberalism. Kerry Rittich, supra note 49.
56 See Christopher Pierson, Democracy, Markets and Capital: Are There Necessary Economic
Limits to Democracy?, XL POLITICAL STUDIES 83-98 (1992).
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popular democracy is regarded as the "Road to Serfdom". 57 Hence, a
second way in which disparaging images of the post-colonial sub-
Saharan African State are deployed in good governance debates is in
justifying the insulation of neo-liberal economic reform from popular
forces. 58 The neo-liberal commitment to individual freedom adopts
individual choices as the basis for the resolution of social problems
and is thus dismissive of the demos. But individual choices merely
focus on the microcosm. This view presents a very confining
approach to the resolution of social problems such as poverty and
economic disadvantage, which are structural and systemic rather than
accidental or reflective of individual pathology. The neo-liberal view
that collective decisions involve coercion and cannot satisfy all
individual preferences is yet another reason why these Westerners
prefer the market to satisfy social needs.
In at least two critical ways, this agenda further seeks to insulate
neo-liberal economic reform and the present distribution of wealth and
entitlement from the control of the demos: first, through the concept
of an autonomous state, committing the state to insulating itself from
special-interest groups seeking special 'favors' or 'privileges'; second,
through the neo-liberal commitment to liberal democracy and the
creation, protection, and maintenance of a system of rights to protect
individual freedom. In this section I will first demonstrate how public-
choice inspired critiques of special interest group activity in the
governance literature lead to the prescription of an autonomous state.
Second, I will examine how, based on its fear of the demos, good
governance's liberal-democratic commitment disenfranchises
solidaristic approaches to the democratic management of society.
S7 FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 100 (1944); THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY
460 (1960); STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS AND ECONOMICS 145 (1969). See also J. L. TALMON,
THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1960). For a sympathetic application of this idea in the
context of Eastern and Central Europe, see Reuven Brenner, The Long Road From Serfdom and How to
Shorten it, 17 CANADIAN Bus. L J. 195 (1990).
5 Thomas Callaghy, Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political
Structure in Africa, supra note 5, at 484. A critical evaluation of neo-liberal reform in Latin America
confirms my claim that neo-liberalism aims at insulating the government from distributional coalitions
that may capsize economic reform. See Hector E. Schamis, Distributional Coalitions and the Politics of
Economic Reform in Latin America. 51 WORLD POLITICS 236 (1999).
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A. State Autonomy in the Governance Agenda: Proscribing
Democratic Control of the Economy
Public-choice critiques of the state, that are adopted in much of the
World Bank's literature on economic 'failure' in Sub-Saharan Africa,
take the view that governments have become hostage to interest groups
which undermine entrepreneurship and enterprise. 59  In this view,
because 'big' and benevolent government has failed, the good
governance agenda seeks to provide new ways of improving the
operation of government. Public-choice approaches are skeptical of
democratic governance since they regard it as being too susceptible to
'favorite' constituencies who subsequently exert improper influence in
the design of economic policies.6° Such policies, it is argued, often
depart from the prescribed neo-liberal economic reform package. One
economist at the World Bank's research department in the 1980's
therefore recommended that "a courageous, ruthless and perhaps
undemocratic government is required to ride roughshod over...
newly-created special interest groups". 6 1 In Williamson's view, it is
undesirable to reconcile the interests of civil society with those of the
state since the implementation of the reform process would be hijacked
by demagogues and populists. Such leadership would, in his view, re-
introduce the discredited policies of the past.62
Reflecting on Williamson's theories, against the backdrop of the
popular discontent and resistance to the implementation of neo-liberal
economic or structural adjustment policies, there is a deep suspicion
among those supporting these programs that populist and demagogic
leaders would emerge. One implication of his analysis is that these
reforms presume, and in fact require, strong executive leadership
capable of both suffocating civil society and undermining the rather
59 PAUL MOSLEY ET AL., supra note 2.
( ROBERT BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA, supra note 18 is one of the best
statement marshalling a combination of approaches, including public choice theory to explain how special
interest groups influence decision making on economic issues. In part, Bates argues that although
protection if interest groups is economically inefficient, it is politically rational.
61 DEEPAK LAL, supra note 3 1, at 33.
62 John Williamson, Democracy and the 'Washington Consensus' 21 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 1329,
1330 (1993). John Williamson is often associated with having coined the term 'Washington Consensus'
and to have begun the task of systematically laying down the basic elements of neo-liberal economic
reform. See John Williamson, What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN
ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 5 (John Williamson ed., 1990).
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narrow ideals of liberal democracy embodied in a peripheral way in
the good governance agenda as defined by the World Bank.
It is noteworthy, but not unexpected, that this agenda does not
expressly refer to insulating neo-liberal programs from societal
pressure. Instead, reference is made to state autonomy. Either way,
this autonomy refers to the insulation of the agenda from attempts to
replace it or derail its implementation. According to the World Bank,
the main function of external aid is to ensure that governments
"sustain reforms against the opposition of those who are adversely
,63affected". Good governance, then, is not primarily concerned with
democracy as a value, but with "getting the politics of development
policy right". 64 For these reasons, the ideas of state autonomy and
state capacity have been criticized for being "exclusively institutional"
categories without simultaneously having any connection to social
relations and civil society. 65  In effect, state capacity is regarded as
merely embodying the interest of its managers rather than a "wider
galaxy, struggles within 'civil society'".66
The World Bank's adoption of a public-choice approach to
interpreting economic performance in sub-Saharan Africa came in its
1981 report, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An
Agenda for Action.67  The timing of the report coincided with an
expanding public-choice literature which argued, at the time, that the
best way to understand slow economic growth rates in sub-Saharan
Africa was to focus on domestic policy deficiencies and administrative
constraints which had been instituted in response to popular pressure,
to satisfy certain constituencies or obtain their support. For example,
63 WORLD BANK, TOWARD SUSTAINED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (1984).
" Gerald J. Schnitz, Democratization and Demystification: Deconstructing 'Governance' as
Development Paradigm, in DEBATING DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE, supra note 24. Paul Mosley, Jane
Harrigan and John Toye note that the original goal of neo-liberalism was not democracy, but to reduce
political intervention in markets and to shrink the public sector. The idea was "a dramatic shift away from
a pluralist, participatory ideal of politics and towards an authoritarian and technocratic ideal based on a
small and highly efficient government." PAUL MOSLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at 16.
6 Gerald J. Schmitz, supra note 24.M Id.
67 WORLD BANK, ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR
CHANGE, supra note 5. For brief commentary along these lines see PAUL MOSLEY ET AL., supra note 1, at
23-24.
68 For a general overview of this trend see PETER GIBBON ET AL., AUTHORITARIANISM,
DEMOCRACY, AND ADJUSTMENT: THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC REFORM IN AFRICA 9-18 (1992); and
generally, Howard Stein and Ernest J. Wilson Ill, Robert Bates, Rational Choice and the Political
Economy of Development in Africa, supra note 18; M. Bienefeld, supra note 18.
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some of the public-choice scholarship argues that the maintenance of
agricultural marketing monopolies, or state-owned enterprises, was
politically rewarding but interfered with the proper functioning of
market-based systems sensitive to changes in demand and supply.
African governments received political rewards from such marketing
monopolies which were otherwise economically tilted against farming
interests, since they provided opportunities for the government to
appoint political patrons on their boards to appease, obtain, or
guarantee electoral or political support.
69
Various approaches to public-choice theory have been adopted in
governance literature. However, in my brief discussion here, I refer to
very particular applications of public choice analysis. 70 I do not intend
to go into a theoretical or empirical analysis of the various public-
choice approaches 71; instead, I begin by pointing out some of the core
assumptions: first, that actors pursue goals; second, that these goals
reflect their self interest; third, that choices are conscious and are made
by individuals; fourth, that preferences are consistent and stable; fifth,
69 A major thesis developed in ROBERT BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AFRICA, supra
note 18 is that although such monopolies provided politically attractive avenues for the appointment of
clients, who would then provide a regime with the required legitimacy, they turned out to be economically
inefficient. Bates also argues that governments maintained below market prices for agricultural products
to avoid urban based riots against high prices. In the context of Zimbabwe, Tor Skalnes has argued the
opposite was the case. Skalnes' explanation lies in his observation that while "commercial farmers
deplored the end of agricultural subsidies with the beginning of the country's structural adjustment
programs in 1990, even though they secured higher incomes due to currency depreciation; industry by
contrast sought the end of exchange controls while small scale African farmers resisted freer agricultural
pricing, since it drove up food prices. African labor unions were completely marginalized, because of the
declining real wages and the elimination of food subsidies". TOR SKALNES, THE POLITICS OF ECONOMIC
REFORM IN ZIMBABWE (1995) quoted in Michael Chege, Time to Put Away the Heroic Stereotypes, supra
note 18, at 14. For arguments on political survival, see also Henry S. Bienen & Mark Gersovitz,
Economic Stabilization, Conditionality, and Political Stability, 39 INT'L ORGANIZATION 729 (1985);
Jeffrey Herbst, Structural Adjustment of Politics in Africa, 18 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 949 (1990); and
Richard Sandbrooke, Economic Crisis, Structural Adjustment and the State in Africa, in THE IMF AND
THE SOUTH: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF CRISIS AND ADJUSTMENT (Dharam Ghai ed., 1991).
70 For such analysis see LARS UDEHN, supra note 18, at 9; DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, supra
note 18.
71 Lars Udehn notes the various approaches to public choice include: "the Virginia (Buchanan,
Tullock, Tollison, Wagner, Brennan), Rochester (Riker, Ordeshook, Ferejohn, Fiorina, Shepsle) and
Bloomington (Elinor and Vincent Ostrom) Schools of public choice, the Chicago (Becker, Stigler,
Peltman) School of political economy, Antony Downs' economic theory of democracy, Mancur Olsen's
logic of collective action, and all applications of the economic theory of politics". LARS UDEHN, supra
note 18, at 9.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDEES-1998-99
that these preferences maximize expected utility; and sixth, that
individuals possess 'extensive information' about alternatives.72
My purpose in discussing public-choice theory is to demonstrate
two implications of the application of some of its core assumptions in
sub-Saharan Africa: first, that its applications justify a departure from
notions of deliberative or participatory democracy which are viewed as
being inconsistent with a very particular style of liberal democracy that
is hostile to public management of resources and investment; and
second, that these applications are ideologically tilted in favor of
market solutions as the best antidote to governmental failure in sub-
Saharan Africa.
Public-choice analysis is primarily based on the methodological
individualism of neo-classical economics. The behavior of individuals
is presumed to conform to a particular set of rules which are
essentially premised on materialist motivations, that is that people
behave just as selfishly in their private lives as they do within the
marketplace and the political sphere. For public-choice theorists, the
essence of methodological individualism is to discount the view that
people in the public arena or in the marketplace and political sphere
behave altruistically or for the benefit of society. 73  As such,
governments that responded to popular demands to establish economic
guarantees, such as free basic education or health care, have become
incapable of controlling their economic performance. They argue that
privatization of basic education and health care will avoid
governmental collapse. Such public-choice inspired analysis ignores
the fact that even within market economies, competitive pressures
similarly drive out altruistic and other-interest impulses. Some
scholars have in fact argued that notwithstanding the theoretical
sophistication of rational-choice (more broadly public-choice) theory,
the empirical work supporting some of their major hypotheses, such as
72 LARS UDEHN, supra note 18, at 368. Udehn, however, notes that some of these assumptions have
not been adhered to consistently in public choice approaches. For example, he notes "a recent tendency to
define self interest in a vacuous sense, as compatible with altruism... [while] [o]rthodox public choice...
definitely operates with the definition of 'self-interest' as 'selfishness"' at 35.
73 The only difference between individual behavior in the public and private spheres, according to
public choice theorists, is the "constraints and rules under which the individual operates, which are critical
for the rational calculation of interest". PETER SELF, GOVERNMENT BY THE MARKET?: THE POLITICS OF
PUBLIC CHOICE 2 (1993).
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the dysfunctional effect of social spending on economic growth, is ill-
founded.
Another assumption of the proponents of public-choice theory is
that of rationality - that a reasonable individual will be a rational
maximizer. Consequently, if the price of a product increases, because
of higher costs, less of it will be demanded since consumers will find it
more expensive. Notwithstanding the fact that not all individuals act
in such a rational manner all the time, public choice theory assumes
that there are enough people who act rationally in the market place as
to make predictions possible based on aggregate choices as opposed to
individual psychology.
75
Public-choice advocates argue that rationality is closely related to
self-interest since self-interest "seems to offer a simple and plausible
basis for defining the scope of rationality". 76  Rationality is thus
inferred from the economic assumptions of the consistency of
individual preferences, since consistency expresses an individual's
utility. Public-choice theory therefore proceeds from the notion of
rationality as a pattern of logical consistency whereby individuals
pursue egocentric goals. Economists such as Amartya Sen have noted
that this concept of rationality, based upon materialist views of self-
interest, is overly narrow since its presumption that individual
preferences can be represented on a one-dimensional scale excludes
personal goals motivated by other impulses such as moral standards
(as opposed to selfish ones) or long, versus short-term interests. 77
Further, the concept of the rationality of human behavior ignores
74 Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro agree that rational choice theorists have yet to explain empirical
realities. However, in reviewing their work, Margaret Levi claims that rational choice theorists have an
improved theory that acknowledges the role for information, norms, and institutions. She also claims that
by focusing exclusively on application of rational choice to North America, Green and Shapiro ignore
important contributions in economic history and comparative politics. In Levi's view, no alternative
methodology, other than rational choice theory in the social sciences, comes closer to demonstrating the
empirical power of its theory. DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE.
A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE, supra note 18, reviewed in Margaret Levi, Note,
110 POL Sl. Q. 326 (1995). For additional reviews of the Green and Shapiro book, see Kristen Renwick
Monroe, Review Article, 25 POL. THEORY 289-295 (1997); Russell Hardin, Review Article, 101 AMER. J.
SoC. 745-77 (1995).
75 PETER SELF, supra note 73, at 8.
76 Id. at 9.
77 AMARTYA SEN. CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 82-104 (1982) as quoted by PETER SELF,
supra note 73, at 9.
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human 'nature' in all its 'complexity' and contingency.78 As such, its
'cultural policy towards workers,' emphasizes "individual outlooks
over collective, private problems over social, clientelistic relations
over solidarity, mass spectacles over community organized cultural
events".
79
My argument, then, is that state autonomy connotes the insulation
of the state from the efforts of civil society to counter-balance
governmental power. It also implies the erection of a strong political
center, an implication supported by the agenda of capacity-building or
the concept of a small efficient state. The question arises, then,
whether this contradicts the declared liberal-democratic intentions of
the good governance agenda and their accompanying assumptions that
civil society serves to counter-balance the power of the state and its
programs. I tackle this question in the next section.
B. Liberal Democracy: Placing Limits on the Demos
It may at first glance appear paradoxical that the World Bank's
governance agenda embraces liberal democracy while simultaneously
employing strong-arm tactics to suppress any governmental opposition
to its programs, especially that which seeks to re-distribute wealth and
entitlement. Such a contradiction may also be found in the view that
democratically elected governments cannot be trusted to determine
prices and economic policies since this would result in re-distributive,
as opposed to wealth-maximizing, economic policies. A close
examination of these reforms, however, reveals no such paradox.
The good governance agenda adopts a view of liberty based on
state establishment and enforcement of a rule-of-law regime within
which individual rights to liberty, property, and enforcement of
78 Howard Stein & Ernest J. Wilson III, The Political Economy of Robert Bates: A Critical Reading
of Rational Cluice in Africa supra note 18, at 1035. These authors further note that Bates "provides a
traditional elite-coalitional analysis of political economy behavior. Where the individual enters, he or she
is merely the cipher for the objectified interest of the particular group - larger farmers, industrialists.
politicians, civil servants - these are the true actors in Bates' political universe. Moreover, they are all
collective actors not individual ones. The individual as an actor has little existence outside of his
existence as a group actor." Id. at 1046.
79 Veltmeyer and his co-authors, James Petra and Steve Vieux, argue that neo-liberalism promotes
"class cohesion at the top, fragmentation in the middle, atomization at the bottom." HENRY VELTMEYER
ET AL., supra note 23.
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contracts is observed.80 This perception is intimately tied to questions
of "prerogative, authority, obedience, arbitrary power, and reason of
state, about limited government, property, due process, rule of law,
and fundamental law" 81, all of which resonate in the neo-liberalism
mantra described in the previous sections. In this view, liberal
democracy is a competitive struggle for the people's vote where there
is a guaranteed universal franchise, a rule-of-law framework, and
protection of individual rights. The role of government is thus limited
to creating a limited system of rights and undertaking activities
required to enforce and/or protect these rights. Because this merely
involves the establishment of standards of conduct, this is, in effect,
simply procedural rather than substantive justice. I refer to this
minimalist view of the state as "market constitutionalism".
This contrasts with an alternative vision of liberty where exclusion
"from the common activity from which decisions are made and the
deeds done that affect the lives of all, is a kind of servitude.
Participation is also the fundamental and indispensable condition of
virtue. Without it the highest virtue, civic virtue never comes to
life".82 In this alternate view, (social) democracy is founded on a
solidarisitic desire for freedom, defined in participatory and communal
rather than in individualist terms; it is not merely a form of elected or
representative government, as under neo-liberalism, but rather a way
of life, a vehicle for collective self-expression and self-determination.
Under market constitutionalism, however, the redistribution of wealth
in order to create a more just and equal society, is not deemed to be an
acceptable or legitimate goal since redistribution involves violating
individual property rights and individual freedom and choice.
Another way to look at this alternative view of democracy is that
distributive or welfare policies are not regarded as unnecessary
interventions in the economy which limit individual freedom and
choice, or undermine the incentives that private ownership of
resources provides to spur entrepreneurship and self-discipline. As
8 See WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT (1992), supra note 2; WORLD BANK.
GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE (1994), supra note 2.
"' JACK H. HEXTER. ON HISTORIANS: REAPPRAISALS OF SOME OF THE MAKERS OF MODERN
HISTORY 302 (1979).
'
2 Id. at 294.
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such, under this conception of democracy, the neo-liberal reservations
to governmental intervention for the public welfare are refuted.
In a broad and general sense, the good governance notion of
freedom is negative." Negative freedoms refer to restraints on
governmental interference of private rights; they are embraced as
prerequisites to imposing accountability on the political leadership, so
that leaders may be kept accountable through established channels
such as independent judiciaries. Leaders would therefore be
theoretically discouraged from acting in their personal interest, and
those of their friends, and contrary to the public interest. However, the
self-interestedness associated with the individualism that underlies this
negative concept of freedom may be said to be in conflict with the
expectation that these negative freedoms would permit civil-society
groups to check the arbitrary exercise of power and the abuse of the
public trust for private gain.
84
While I do not doubt the significance of holding leaders
accountable, questions of wealth, power, poverty, inequality and
distribution of resources are issues of deep political controversy,
conflict and struggle. These questions cannot be sufficiently addressed
through these negative conceptions of liberty that is insufficient to call
attention to the need for maximizing individual and collective welfare.
There are, however, several theoretical justifications, which are not
inconsistent with free markets and individual liberty, which could form
the basis of such an advocacy strategy. As an example, rent theory
suggests a possible basis for a functional idea of personal liberty. 
s
Robert Hale argued that it is possible to revise property rights in order
to secure maximum equality in a manner consistent with maintaining
adequate incentives to produce.86  Under a Halean rent theory, a
83 Why I characterize the negative conception of freedom in neo-liberal discourse as general is
because, as already noted, neo-liberalism accommodates notions such as social safety nets, albeit at the
margins. Consequently, neo-liberal notions of freedom may be said to be broader than only negative,
althouj negative conceptions of freedom underlie most of the economic and political proposals.
" DAVID BEETHAm, HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: A MULTIFACETED RELATIONSHIP 21
(1995).
85 Other approaches include utilitarianism, under which wealth would be distributed in accordance
with the greatest good to the greatest number. Progressive utilitarians argued that transferring incremental
funds from the rich to the poor would increase aggregate well being. Idealists justified progressive social
policies by arguing that since property was a creature of the state, private property ought to be protected
only if it served the public interest.
6 Robert Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470
(1923); Bargaining, Duress and Economic Uberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1943).
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person is only entitled to that which she has created with her own
labor. This differs from neo-classical assumptions that justify
entitlements (goods and services) at prices that are determined in the
market; it follows that entitlements are legitimate only when they are
compensated on a cost basis. Any surplus would then be considered
an economic rent since it is produced in excess of the seller's costs.
Consequently, rather than a seller becoming entitled to these economic
rents, the community would own them and would be free to
redistribute them as it chose. In this manner, rent theory is entirely
consistent with the market individualism which is argued to provide
the entrepreneurship that drives capitalism; and it does not place the
political utility of rights over and above their social utility in the same
way that the negative concept of rights adopted in the liberal
democratic component of the neo-liberal prescriptions does.
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C. Is there a new relationship between the electoral process, markets
and the legitimacy of the State?
Neo-liberal proposals denigrate one of the central sources of
governmental legitimacy in a democracy - the government's
responsiveness and commitment to the satisfaction of electoral
demands for subsidized, fundamental services, such as basic health
and education, which, in unequal societies, are often out of reach for
ordinary citizens. This criticism only serves to undermine political
free-will, resulting in the political disenfranchisement. Curiously, the
attack on the use of large-scale social programs to redress social and
political inequality appears to be based not on any empirical data but
rather on the argument that governmental intervention, no matter how
successful, runs contrary to the neo-liberal concepts of democracy and
the free-market system.
The good governance agenda provides two alternative primary
avenues through which governmental legitimacy in sub-Saharan
87 The idea that the political utility of rights may overrun other personal advantages that rights
holders may derive from them is made by Amartya Sen. Freedonts and Needs, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan.
10-17, 1993 at 36. In his view, the real issue in thinking about political rights and other needs is not the
absolute precedence of personal liberty, but whether a person's liberty should be given more importance
than other types of advantages such as incomes. Hence he says that "political rights are not (therefore]
symmetrical with other sources of individual advantage; and the safeguarding of political rights would
have the procedural priority that follows from this asymmetry." Id.
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
Africa must be derived. First, through market constitutionalism - the
view that the state's role should be largely confined to establishing a
rule-of-law regime that safeguards property, adequately compensates
for torts, and enforces contracts. Citizens can then enter into contracts
and apply their entrepreneurial skills in trade, commerce, and other
economically productive activities free from governmental inhibitions.
Second, through the belief that liberal democracy is the antidote to the
political authoritarianism of the postcolonial African State. Here,
liberal democracy primarily refers to universal franchise, the right to
vote, and protection of individual rights within a free market economy.
Consequently, good governance debates proceed from the
assumption that the essence of democratic governance rests on a
formal structure, or a determinate set of necessary relations, rather than
on the aims and purposes of the local polity.88 The good governance
agenda proceeds by discrediting and rejecting an alternative radical
view of democracy: the view that governmental legitimacy flows from
its commitment to respond to electoral demands for provision of basic
services, especially for economically disenfranchised citizens. It is in
this sense that the good governance agenda rejects and discredits the
view that governmental legitimacy, especially for economically
disenfranchized people, arises in part from satisfying electoral
demands for provision of basic services that help "attach people to the
system".
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Under the good governance agenda, governmental legitimacy must
instead be derived from a commitment to liberal democracy (the
universal franchise, right to vote, and protection of individual rights
within a free market economy), free markets, and the rejection of state-
sponsored development initiatives. A significant reason why liberal
democracy and market reform have claimed a radical, liberating
potential - as the new markers of legitimate governance in sub-
Saharan Africa - is the perceived intention of the African
governments, during the 60's and 70's, to sacrifice individual liberty in
" For a critique of attempts to build models of democracy as if this constituted the essence of
democracy, see Paul Corcoran. Limits of Democratic Theory, in DEMOCRACY THEORY AND PRACTICE 20-
22 (Graeme Duncan ed., 1983).
89 Provision of basic services in response to electoral demands, or from a commitment to address
inequalities in society, is often regarded as capable of conferring "democratic legitimacy upon the
democratic apparatus as a whole". Graeme Duncan. Introduction, in DEMOCRACY THEORY AND
PRACTICE supra note 88, at 4.
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order to attain economic growth.9° The popularization of one party
governance within which the popular or general will surpasses the
individual will has been criticized for repressing individual liberty and
constraining the effective exercise of entrepreneurship in trade and
commerce and participation in political life.9' This repression of
individual will is also attacked for understating internal differences
based on sex, gender, class and ethnic background within sub-Saharan
African states.
In the early 1990s, the popularization of the good governance
agenda clearly benefited from the fortuitous demise and alleged failure
of the Soviet communist regime and its state-run economy. However,
the euphoric and apocalyptic message of the radical, liberating
potential of markets and liberal democracy camouflages the ways in
which market reforms can undermine other sources of democratic
legitimacy for these governments - particularly, their ability or
commitment to respond to the fundamental, economic and political
needs of their citizenry. These types of initiatives, rather than being
entrusted to the African governments, are for the most part relegated to
foreign and local non-governmental actors and to the market place. By
placing the responsibility for these initiatives in the hands of others,
thereby depriving African states of the opportunity to demonstrate that
they can successfully satisfy the political and economic needs of their
constituents, it may be said that the neo-liberals have undermined
African governmental authority and promoted a pervasive fear of
popular politics.
Another way that Western reformers deal with the issues of
poverty and inequality, having already criticized and discredited the
role of the African state, is to seek to transform the "economic
mentality" of the citizenry in at least two ways. First, they presume
that their neo-liberal proposals will imbue the people with a desire to
"See Issa Shivji, Human Rights and Development: A Fragmented Discourse (Paper presented at
the Workshop on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and Public Order in Tanzania, Dares Salaam, April
1995). See also JAGDISH BHAGWATI. THE ECONOMICS OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES (1966); Atul
Kohli, Democracy and Development, in DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES RECONSIDERED 156 (John P. Lewis
and Valeriana Kallab, eds.. 1986); Jagdish Bhagwati, Democracy and Development, 3 J. OF DEMOCRACY
37 (1992); The New Thinking on Development, 6 J. OF DEMOCRACY 50 (1995); Kivutha Kibwana, Human
Rights and/or Economic Development: Challenges and Response, 1993 THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES,
43; CLAUDE AKE, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF DIS-EMPOWERMENT IN AFRICA (1994); DEMOCRACY AND
DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA (1996).
9 PETER BAUER, A DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT, supra note 3 1.
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better themselves economically; and second, they also presuppose that
their proposals will convince the people to achieve their goals
independently rather than looking to the government for help. In brief,
the neo-liberal prescription is to establish initiatives that promote self-
interest and entrepreneurship while simultaneously lessening the
populace's financial dependence on the state. By proceeding in this
fashion, however, the neo-liberals have adopted a view of liberal
democracy that doesn't accept popular participation or
democratization of the marketplace and the economy. By placing
these spheres beyond the demos, neo-liberalism may be said to have
promoted a pervasive fear of popular politics and thereby undermined
social democratic controls on economic hierarchy and division.
Throughout the world, many human rights activists seek to deepen
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and expand the neo-liberal's notion of negative liberty. However,
many governments and the World Bank have easily co-opted
participatory initiatives that look to transcend the neo-liberal agenda of
creating a system of rights leading them to undertake activities
required to enforce and/or protect these procedural rights. The World
Bank, for example, promotes participatory initiatives only within the
limits of preordained projects to "deliver 'political sustainability' for
neo-liberal policies". 9
Within the good governance agenda, then, citizen participation has
at least two meanings: first, involvement in elections through
exercising the right to vote; second, promoting citizen involvement
within pre-defined, neo-liberal economic programs. Under the second
example, participation has a variety of restrictive and instrumental
connotations related to ensuring the success of neo-liberalism - for
example, the promotion of self-reliant entrepreneurship. Here, the
"2 S. KOTHARI AND H. SETHI. RETHINKING HUMAN RIGHTS: CHALLENGES FOR THEORY AND
ACTION (1989); KEBA M'BAYE, EMERGENCE OF THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AS A HUMAN RIGHT IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1978); ISSA SHivil, THE CONCEPT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA (1989); Philip Alston, Out of the Abyss: The Challenges Confronting the New
U. N. Conmittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 332 (1987); Philip Alston and
Gerald Quinn, The Nature and Scope of States' Parties' Obligations Under the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 162 (1987); J. Oloka-Onyango, Beyond the
Rhetoric: Reinvigorating the Struggle for Econonic and Social Rights in Africa, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. I,
7(1995).
"3 Gerald J. Schmitz, supra note 24, at 73. This is also a major theme of my article, Good
Governance as a Counter-Insurgency Agenda to Oppositional and Transformative Social Projects in
International Law, supra note *.
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World Bank argues that the poor are its 'customers.' It tries to
transform their 'culture of dependence' into entrepreneurs or
"customers in good standing who must be enabled to pay for the costs
for what they see will bring them betterment with their time, labor and
capital".
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For several reasons, this concept of the poor is problematic. As
Gerald Schmitz argues, this view is apolitical since it says nothing
about the present distributional patterns of wealth and entitlements;
these are taken for granted, as is political power and questions of
hierarchy and class within the societies where the poor live. It
therefore reduces the poor to mere beneficiaries of pre-designed
projects. Their agency to struggle for change is either ignored or
understated. Instead, within the capitalist order imposed by neo-
liberalism, the poor must rely on promoting their entrepreneurial skills,
which underestimates the structural impediments to emancipation as
well as the restrictive conditions within which individuals presumably
make free choices and exercise or sharpen their entrepreneurial skills.
These conditions of hierarchy, social division, and inequality are not
questioned, but are rather entrenched by neo-liberalism.
The World Bank's good governance agenda can therefore be
regarded as a rhetorical commitment (and an ideological strategy)
intended to co-opt the legitimacy of the struggle for democratization
and human rights in sub-Saharan Africa that may paradoxically have
been targeted against neo-liberalism in the first place. This agenda
cannot therefore be understood as simply opening the door to popular
participation; but rather, attention must be paid to its socially and
economically disenfranchising impacts. This is very significant,
especially in view of the fact that there is no overriding commitment to
remake the policies and institutional contexts that have made such
disenfranchisement possible.
In another sense, the liberal-democratic elements of the good
governance agenda replay an oft-stated fear of popular democracy -
self-interested, greedy, and powerful leaders representing the
"democratically strong" ignorant masses. Here, the use of the
disparaging images of unruly Africans helps to justify the fear of the
9 Lawrence Salmen, Reducing Poverty: An Institutional Perspective, in POVERTY AND SOCIAL
POLICY SERIES 23 (World Bank Paper No. I, 1992) quoted in Gerald J. Schmitz, supra note 24, at 73.
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demos. However, this fear of the masses is of course not specific to
the African context, but rather it is a general characteristic of a specific
strand or lineage of Western liberal democracy where rule by the
masses or the demos was regarded as a 'perversion of polity'. It
proceeds from an individualistic ethic that merely proclaims that
power resides in the people, "once upon a time, or occasionally or
simply notionally". 95  Throughout the history of Western liberal-
democracy, this ethic was reflected by the exclusion of marginalized
groups such as women, non-White or European people, lower classes,
the un-propertied, and the uneducated from the franchise. 96  This
differs from a solidaristic concept of democracy in which people
actively rule in whole or in part not only through electoral systems, but
also through forms of direct democracy or plebiscites. In addition,
such a solidaristic conception of democracy is not confined to the
political supremacy of the political sphere as an arena for the
maximization of individual freedom; instead, it reaches out to the
economic sphere which is insulated from the demos within specific
lineages of market constitutionalism/liberal democracy such as the one
adopted by neo-liberalism.
The liberal-democratic fear of the demos also arises from its
association of democracy with instability, partisanship, inclination to
tyranny, prioritization of cultural over cosmopolitan or secular values,
divisiveness, and vicious behavior. All these features have historically
characterized debates on democracy from Plato and Aristotle. The
neo-liberal adoption of the fear of the demos in its liberal-democratic
model is therefore consistent with the tradition of thought that has
justified the oligarchical rule by a few wise people to avoid the 'mean
and fractious spirit' that characterizes democratic rule,97
The reproduction of the fear of the demos in Africa takes the
peculiar form of invoking disparaging images of the poor in
conjunction with self-serving leaders who horde undeserved wealth,
thereby undermining the common good. As we saw with the public-
choice orientation, this reinforces the neo-liberal preoccupation with
95 Paul Corcoran, supra note 88, at 14.
9Will Kymlicka, Liberal Complacencies, 22 BOSTON REVIEW, Oct/Nov. 1997, at 29-30. See also,
WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995),
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989).
'" Paul Corcoran, supra note 88, at 17.
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disproving the possibility of a common good or the public interest.
The advocates of these conservative, economic reform programs, in
order to legitimize themselves and the underlying, liberal-democratic
model, feel compelled to invoke only negative or disparaging African
images because, in the process, they tend to denigrate far-reaching
programs of political, economic and social emancipation.
IV, CONCLUSION
I have argued that good governance literature in general, and the
World Bank in particular, represents an ideological position that seeks
to refute the socialist, Keynesian-welfare, and re-distributive/social
justice oriented nationalist economic policies of the post-colonial
African state. This argument is advanced by resort to disparaging and
inaccurate images of the African State, its political leadership, and its
citizenry. The argument is flawed in at least two other major respects.
First, in the manner in which good governance literature attributes
responsibility for the lack of economic development in Africa solely to
the policies, ideologies and practices of the postcolonial state, corrupt
leaders and lazy Africans. While good governance literature correctly
attributes fault to past corruption and mismanagement, it falls to
acknowledge and take into account the external factors, such as the
inexorable impact of the colonial period, the location of the continent
in the fringes of the international capitalist order, or the devastating
divisiveness of the Cold-War period. Second, good governance
literature criticizes prior development approaches and recommends a
new approach, the effect of which is to disable governmental capacity
to enhance social justice which had been part of the previous approach
to development. In essence, the good governance agenda, by
obsessing on the negative aspects of the African political and
economic experience, fails to see anything positive in the previous
approach to development. Similarly, because the African experience
in all its complexity does not fit squarely into the overly (and
improperly) narrow definition of democracy, African nationalist
projects designed to protect local resources and interests are
inaccurately regarded as repressing individual initiative, encouraging
corruption, and discouraging foreign investment. When the good
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
governance agenda only views the African experience through the
telescope of neo-liberalism, it unfairly prejudices an entire continent
by painting all of Africa with one brush stroke (or set of images) and
failing to see the whole picture - one that contains positive as well as
negative experiences.
The negative portrayal of the African state as incessantly
preoccupied with re-distributive rather than productive struggles is in
part explicable by the adoption of public-choice-inspired analysis
which seeks to explain how African states have been held hostage by
conflicting, yet powerful, interest groups. In essence, this scholarship
by and large argues that the African State lacks autonomy from groups
whose interests are directly in conflict with those that want to reform
the economy.9
8
As embraced by good governance advocates, the concepts of state
autonomy and liberal-democracy seek to insulate economic policy-
making from popular demands since such forces are regarded as
capable of derailing the process or holding neo-liberal economic
reform hostage, by requiring high social spending, bloated budgets,
and ever-increasing deficits. In addition to the very unflattering
descriptions of the African State and its leadership, good governance
literature has advanced similarly negative and unfair portrayals of
Africans as lazy citizens, awaiting governmental handouts. These
observations refute any assumption or assertion that good governance
proposals are technically, culturally and ideologically neutral. To lend
credibility to its proposals, the neo-liberal discourse on good
governance also plays upon specific unflattering memories of a chaotic
African past. "It is not a simple straightforward process, but a
questions of 'seizing hold' of these fragmentary images as they occur
in order to understand why certain narratives continue to mediate
important political questions".99 In an attempt to legitimize the new
'order', these memories and images, although fragmentary and
specific, are invoked as unchanging realities.
In a similar fashion, under colonialism, nationalist leadership
invoked specific images of the past in order to challenge those aspects
98 See Part 11 (i) and (ii) above.
9 Vron Ware. Moments of Danger: Race, Gender, and Memories of an Empire, 31 HISTORY AND
THEORY 116, 131 (1992).
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of the status quo established by colonial rule that they did not regard to
be aligned with their interests.'1° Neo-liberalism, like these nationalist
invocations, depicts the postcolonial order as a failed Africanist
experiment. In this sense, therefore, neo-liberals are not the first to
bring up the past. What is specific to neo-liberalism, however, is its
reliance on the inaccurate and disparaging images referred to
throughout this article as justification for its conservative, political and
economic programs. The World Bank's good governance agenda, in
particular, seeks to hold itself out as a secularizing and liberating
universal project, rather than as a project embodying a specific
Western lineage of political and economic thought.' 0 '
In this sense, good governance is as much a cultural project or
paradigm as it is a technocratic, economic program. Presenting it in
these terms reveals the underlying racist stereotyping of post-colonial,
sub-Saharan African states, their politicians, and their citizens. Its
technical and economic jargon is therefore representative of the
inherent Euro-American hegemony, laden with specific and biased
values, ideas and meanings. In constructing its agenda in these terms,
its understanding of the world and its received wisdom conveys these
values and concepts as immutable truths. In this sense, therefore, good
governance demonstrates that power and knowledge are inseparable
from social convention and practice.1
0 2
In order to justify neo-liberalism as the antidote - to introduce the
regularity of law as an organizing principle, to suppress the disorder of
the post-colonial African state, and to tame the demos as Africa
evolves toward a more ideal and perfect system - the good governance
proposals conjure up these powerful images of disorder, chaos, and
anarchy as characteristic of sub-Saharan African statehood. These
images are then used by the neo-liberals to police the unruly character
of African governance and demos. This positioning in turn justifies
" For my thoughts see James Thuo, Gathii, International Law and Eurocentricity, 9 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 184 (1998).
tot David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545 (1997).
102 PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); JOSEPH CAMPBELL WITH BILL MOYERS, THE
POWER OF MYTH (Betty Sue Flowers, ed., 1988); MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER AND KNOWLEDGE (R.
Gordon, trans., 1980).
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authoritarian modes of policing and suppressing opposition in order to
contain and control this character.
In conclusion, as I have demonstrated, these disparaging and
prejudicial images of Africa are operating silently yet powerfully
within the discourses of neo-liberal economic reform. Their use tends
to provide legitimacy to specific projects of neo-liberal economic
reform. Good governance then is the vehicle through which these
often racist and hidden operations of neo-liberalism are constructed in
a commonsensical way. In this way, good governance reinforces
certain deeply embedded assumptions and prejudices about cultural
difference. These attitudes which constitute an important part of
cultural and non-material forms of oppression of non-western
societies, are inseparable from the oppression that arises from
international economic disparities between rich industrial countries
and poor non-industrialized countries such as those of sub-Saharan
Africa.
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